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THE FRAGILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
YASMIN DAWOOD
ABSTRACT
Is the survival of constitutional democracy in America at serious
risk? Given the actions of the Trump administration, and given the
decline of democracy and concomitant rise of authoritarianism the
world over, there is genuine cause for alarm. In light of these
fears, it is worth remembering that the authors of The Federalist
Papers were notably pessimistic about the survival chances of republican government. To what extent have their constitutional design innovations contributed to present woes, and conversely, to
what extent will the Constitution ensure the survival of democracy?
This Essay argues that while the design of the Constitution is both
helpful and harmful, much will ultimately turn on the political dimension. In particular, this Essay claims that the republic will
survive only if the ongoing practices of democracy re-affirm its
central values. But there are significant challenges to maintaining
constitutional democracy. In addition to President Trump in the
White House, current challenges include the decline in the democratic norms of civility and compromise, the rise of ideological
warfare and hyperpartisanship, and the ever-deepening polarization between opposing camps—not only in government but also in
the public at large. In the coming years, the continued vigilance
and resistance of individuals and institutions will be crucially important to ensure the survival of constitutional democracy in America.
It is hard to keep up with the Trump presidency; every hour seems to
bring a fresh assault on the norms of democratic governance. At his first
extended press conference, President Trump berated the media for leaking
“fake” news by reporting the findings of intelligence agencies on the pre© 2017 Yasmin Dawood.
 Canada Research Chair in Democracy, Constitutionalism, and Electoral Law, and Associate
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election communications between Trump’s campaign staff and Russian officials.1 He later fired James Comey, the Director of the FBI, who had been
running an investigation into Russia’s meddling with the U.S. election.2
Trump also undermined the authority of the judicial branch by questioning
the legitimacy of the “so-called judge” who rendered a decision on his Muslim travel ban.3 He has repeatedly stated that millions of ineligible people
voted when, in fact, there is scant evidence of voter fraud.4 He has described
the media as “the enemy of the people.”5 More recently, President Trump
was charged by a Republican Senator with issuing reckless threats that could
place the United States “on the path to World War III.”6
There are many more examples to draw upon that raise genuine worries
about the future of democratic governance in America.7 While there does not
yet appear to be a democracy-ending crisis, Trump’s repeated attacks on the
media, the judiciary, the intelligence agencies, Congress, the Republican and
Democratic parties, and the bureaucracy, have given rise to a profound anxiety that a crisis will erupt during his presidential term.8 Even in the absence
of a constitutional crisis, such attacks are eroding democratic norms, processes, and institutions.
The future of constitutional democracy is also under significant threat
the world over. In a number of countries—including most notably Hungary,
1. Ben Jacobs, This Press Conference Is Proof Donald Trump Will Never Be Presidential,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2017, 3:34 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/16/donaldtrump-press-conference-administration-defense-media.
2. Dustin Volz & Susan Cornwell, Comey Had Pushed for More Resources for Russia Probe
Before Being Fired by Trump: Source, REUTERS (May 10, 2017, 7:40 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-comey-replacement-idUSKBN1861HK.
3. Michael C. Bender, Trump Criticizes ‘So-Called Judge’ Who Lifted Travel Ban, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 5, 2017, 12:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-attacks-judge-who-lifted-travelban-1486228352.
4. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump to Order Inquiry into Voter Fraud and Suppression, BOS.
GLOBE (May 12, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2017/05/11/trump-order-inquiry-into-voter-fraud-and-suppression/eCe2YXaVfLn4UpjhDh2NTN/story.html.
5. David Jackson, Trump Again Calls Media ‘Enemy of the People’, USA TODAY (Feb. 24,
2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/24/donald-trump-cpac-media-enemy-of-the-people/98347970/.
6. Jonathan Martin & Mark Landler, Bob Corker Says Trump’s Recklessness Threatens
‘World War III’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/08/us/politics/trump-corker.html
7. For a compilation, see The Editorial Board, The Republican’s Guide to Presidential Etiquette, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/08/opinion/editorials/republican-etiquette-guide.html (cataloguing instances of President Trump’s norm-violating
conduct so that Republican leaders “never forget what they now condone in a president”).
8. As Jack Balkin argues, however, the prospect of “constitutional rot” presents distinct concerns from, and can exist in, the absence of, a constitutional crisis. Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional
Crisis and Constitutional Rot, 77 MD. L. REV. 147, 151 (2017). Balkin defines constitutional rot as
“a process of decay in the features of our system of government that maintain it as a healthy democratic republic.” Id.

194

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 77:192

Poland, and Turkey—we have witnessed democratic backsliding via constitutional and legal means, which leave a facade of democratic institutions
while hollowing out democracy’s substance.9 Empirical data suggest that
newer democracies have become increasingly authoritarian.10 In 2010,
nearly 53 of 128 countries were assessed as “defective democracies.”11 One
worldwide index of democracy, which measures the electoral process, pluralism, participation, government functioning, and civil liberties, found that
“democracy was in retreat across nearly the entire globe.”12
These global trends prompt the following questions: Is the survival of
constitutional democracy in America at serious risk? To what extent has the
Constitution contributed to present woes? Conversely, to what extent will
constitutional structures ensure the survival of democracy? I claim in this
Essay that while the structural deficiencies of the Constitution are significant,
the outcome will ultimately turn on the political dimension. I am cautiously
optimistic that the republic will survive the Trump administration, but my
optimism is based on the continued resistance of individuals and institutions.
Constitutional democracy will avoid a crisis only if the ongoing practices of
democracy reaffirm its central values. This Essay identifies some of these
practices of constitutional democracy, and shows how they have eroded key
democratic values such as representation and equality. Before considering
these democratic practices, this Essay addresses the role of the Constitution
in undermining or protecting the structures of democratic government.
Given our current fears, it is worth remembering that the Framers, or at
least the authors of The Federalist Papers, were notably pessimistic about
the survival chances of republican government. In Federalist No. 9, Alexander Hamilton observed:
It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of
Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust
at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and
at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a

9. Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018); Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405 (2007);
Kim Lane Scheppele, The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Governance Checklists Do Not
Work, 26 GOVERNANCE 559 (2013); Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100 CORNELL
L. REV. 391 (2015); Kim Lane Scheppele, Worst Practices and the Transnational Legal Order (or
How to Build a Constitutional “Democratorship” in Plain Sight) (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://www.law.utoronto.ca/utfl_file/count/documents/events/wright-scheppele2016.pdf.
10. JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT: THE REVOLT OF THE MIDDLE CLASS
AND THE WORLDWIDE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 7 (2013).
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id. at 10.
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state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and
anarchy.13
James Madison sounded a similar note of doom with his assessment that
republican governments have been “spectacles of turbulence and contention,” which “have in general been as short in their lives as they have been
violent in their deaths.”14 He observed that the “instability, injustice, and
confusion introduced into the public councils have, in truth, been the mortal
diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished.”15
The lessons of history were clear: republican governments inevitably succumbed to revolution, anarchy, or tyranny.
It is an open question as to whether the authors of The Federalist Papers
believed that the combination of their institutional innovations—the extended sphere, federalism, bicameralism, the separation of powers, checks
and balances, the Electoral College, and assorted veto points—would stave
off the fatal instabilities to which republican governments were historically
prone. Certainly, it was in their strategic interest to claim that a large republic
would not be susceptible to the vulnerabilities that plagued the small democracies of the ancient world.
But now, with President Trump in the White House, and with genuine
concerns being raised about whether the United States is heading toward tyranny or anarchy or some combination of the two, it is important to enquire
whether the Constitution is helpful or harmful to the survival of democracy.
On the negative side of the ledger, there is the depressing irony that the
very institution the Framers believed would prevent an unsuitable president
is the very institution that has installed Trump in the White House. Setting
aside the deficiencies of the Electoral College, there are, as Sanford Levinson
argues, a number of non-optimal features of the hard-wired or structural Constitution.16 One major problem is that presidents wield too much power, particularly in the context of emergencies.17 Another problem is that the Constitution’s multiple veto points create serious obstacles to policy formation
and implementation.18
Those same veto points, however, may prove to work as the Framers
had intended them to, namely by providing a check against Trump’s agenda.
13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 39 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 49 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
15. Id. at 45.
16. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 23–24 (2006).
17. Id. at 107; see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 266
(2005) (arguing “[t]he Framers’ misunderstanding of the presidency was the biggest of their mistakes”).
18. LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 38. The veto points include federalism, bicameralism, and
the presidential veto—all of which serve to check and diffuse the power of the federal government.
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For example, the Republicans in Congress have shown some resistance to his
agenda.19 Two additional constitutional features may also serve as checks
against presidential power: federalism and an independent judiciary. Although, currently the Republican Party holds a majority of the states on the
federal level, there is at least the possibility of some check to presidential
power by state and local governments.20 More crucially, the judicial branch
will have to play a central role in protecting the rule of law and constitutional
rights, as the recent controversy over Trump’s travel ban demonstrates.
Ultimately, though, much will turn on developments in the political
arena. Or to be more precise, the structural deficiencies of the Constitution
will be rendered more or less problematic by the political environment. To
put it another way, it is the interaction between constitutional and political
factors that will be determinative of the outcome rather than the strengths and
deficiencies of the Constitution on its own. To be sure, the divide between
constitutional and political factors is perhaps impossible to discern in practice
since the Constitution provides the structures and incentives through which
political forces are developed and expressed. Even so, the structural deficiencies of the Constitution have remained constant over time, but what
makes them particularly acute is the political environment. For this reason,
I claim that constitutional democracy will avoid decay only if the ongoing
practices of democracy re-affirm its central values. These practices of constitutional democracy include the choices of political actors, the evolution of
the political culture, and the interaction of democratic norms and institutions.
The health of constitutional democracy depends on whether these political
practices affirm or erode the central democratic values of representation, fairness, equality, and accountability.
There are several political practices that, to my mind, present significant
challenges to constitutional democracy. The first is that political parties are
highly ideological and more divided than they were twenty years ago.21
19. For example, President Trump did not receive sufficient support from Republican members
of the House for his health care legislation, which was pulled before the vote was to take place. A
revised version of the legislation was approved by the House, and has undergone multiple rounds
of revision in the Senate without, as of this writing, being adopted. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis,
Trump Laces into McCain over His Opposition to Health Care Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/23/us/politics/trump-mccain-graham-cassidy-health-careobamacare.html; Thomas Karlan & Robert Pear, House Passes Measure to Repeal and Replace the
Affordable Care Act, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/us/politics/health-care-bill-vote.html; Trump Defiant After Health Care Bill Pulled Before Vote, BBC
NEWS (Mar. 25, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39388815.
20. Liz Robbins, ‘Sanctuary City’ Mayors Vow to Defy Trump’s Immigration Order, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/nyregion/outraged-mayors-vow-todefy-trumps-immigration-order.html.
21. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 44
(2012).
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There is no longer any ideological overlap between the most conservative
Democrats and the most liberal Republicans.22 As Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes have argued, the Madisonian “separation of powers” has been replaced by a “separation of parties.”23
Extreme partisan polarization is now the “defining attribute” of the U.S
political system.24 The current political climate is marked by the contempt
that each side shows for the other. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that compromise is necessary for democratic governance.25 The intensely partisan and ideological nature of political competition, however,
means that politicians will block the passage of legislation that is in the public
interest in order to prevent the other party from enjoying an electoral advantage.26 This toxic partisan dynamic in Washington, and the demands of
the permanent campaign, have apparently contributed to the acquiescence of
Republican party leaders to the dubious priorities of President Trump. The
erosion of democratic norms, such as cooperation and compromise across
party lines, has been accompanied by a corresponding decline in the functioning of democratic institutions.
Partisanship is now not only the driving determinant of governance but
also of the underlying rules of the democratic process. In the wake of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder,27 many states have
passed voter identification rules that will suppress minority votes.28 The
Court, under Chief Justice Roberts, has also continued to dismantle campaign
finance regulation.29 Congress has become increasingly dependent on a tiny
minority of the population, namely funders and lobbyists.30 Studies have
shown that the positions adopted by elected representatives are more responsive to the preferences of the affluent as compared to the preferences of the
vast majority of citizens.31 The pathologies of the electoral infrastructure

22. Id. at 45.
23. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2311, 2313, 2329 (2006).
24. Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 275 (2011).
25. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE: WHY GOVERNING
DEMANDS IT AND CAMPAIGNING UNDERMINES IT 1 (2012).
26. Id. at 207–10.
27. 570 U.S. 2 (2013).
28. Election 2016: Restrictive Voting Laws by the Numbers, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept.
28, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/election-2016-restrictive-voting-laws-numbers.
29. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
30. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN
TO STOP IT 110 (2011).
31. LARRY BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
GILDED AGE (2008); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012).
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have contributed to the creation of an arguably unrepresentative and unaccountable central government which, in turn, has opened the door to a demagogue who could whip up the grievances of a population that felt abandoned
by the political system.
The decline in civility and compromise, the rise of ideological warfare
and hyperpartisanship, and the ever-deepening polarization between opposing camps are not only the key features of the political landscape at the elite
level, they are also characteristic of the public at large.32 America is a nation
divided, each with its own set of facts (or alternative facts) and its own sense
of the truth. Although Trump received one of the lowest percentages of the
popular vote, he still received 46.1%—almost half of those Americans who
voted.33 After his first month in office, he had the lowest approval rating in
history at that stage of the presidency, but he still had the approval of 44% of
Americans despite (or because of) the positions he had taken in his first
month.34 These statistics suggest that almost half of Americans are in agreement with Trump’s actions so far, including (arguably) his disdain and hostility towards religious and other minorities. Far from seeing Trump as an
existential threat to the republic, there are literally millions of people who
believe that he is saving America. This profound divide in the political culture, and the rapidly evaporating areas of common ground among citizens,
will be a significant challenge to American democracy.
Given democracy’s demonstrable fragility, there is certainly cause for
alarm in the present circumstances. Constitutional democracy in America
will avoid a crisis only if the ongoing practices of democracy re-affirm its
central values and institutions. In the coming years, the continued vigilance
and resistance of individuals and institutions will be crucially important. In
a recent interview, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said that “the true symbol of

32. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, BROKEN TRUST: DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (2015); Yasmin Dawood, Democratic Dysfunction and Constitutional
Design, 94 B.U. L. REV. 913 (2014); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Democracy and Dysfunction: An Exchange, 50 IND. L. REV. 281 (2017).
33. Nick Wing, Final Popular Vote Total Shows Hillary Clinton Won Almost 3 Million More
Ballots than Donald Trump, HUFF. POST (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hillary-clinton-popular-vote_us_58599647e4b0eb58648446c6.
34. Bradford Richardson, NBC/Wall Street Journal Poll: President Trump Approval Rating at
TIMES
(Feb.
26,
2017),
http://www.washington44
Percent,
WASH.
times.com/news/2017/feb/26/nbcwall-street-journal-poll-president-trump-approv/. By May 2017,
his approval had sunk to thirty-six percent according to a Quinnipiac poll. See Adam Edelman,
President Trump’s Approval Numbers Fall to Near-Record Lows in New Poll, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(May 11, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/poll-trump-approval-numbers-fallnear-record-article-1.3156464.
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the United States is not the bald eagle; it is the pendulum, and when the pendulum swings too far in one direction, it will go back.”35 To my mind, the
pendulum will swing back only if there is sufficient support among political
elites and the public for maintaining democratic norms and institutions.

35. Kristine Guerra, Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Trump’s Presidency: “We Are Not Experiencing
the Best of Times,” TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 25, 2017), http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/national/ruth-bader-ginsburg-on-trumps-presidency-we-are-not-experiencing-thebest/2314499.

